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Abstract 18 
 19 
Bayes factors provide a symmetrical measure of evidence for one model versus another (e.g. H1 20 
versus H0) in order to relate theory to data. These properties help solve some (but not all) of the 21 
problems underlying the credibility crisis in psychology. The symmetry of the measure of evidence 22 
means that there can be evidence for H0 just as much as for H1; or the Bayes factor may indicate 23 
insufficient evidence either way. P-values cannot make this three-way distinction. Thus, Bayes 24 
factors indicate when the data count against a theory (and when they count for nothing); and thus 25 
they indicate when replications actually support H0 or H1 (in ways that power cannot). There is 26 
every reason to publish evidence supporting the null as going against it, because the evidence can be 27 
measured to be just as strong either way (thus the published record can be more balanced).  Bayes 28 
factors can be B-hacked but they mitigate the problem because a) they allow evidence in either 29 
direction so people will be less tempted to hack in just one direction; b) as a measure of evidence 30 
they are insensitive to the stopping rule; c) families of tests cannot be arbitrarily defined; and d) 31 
falsely implying a contrast is planned rather than post hoc becomes irrelevant (though the value of 32 
pre-registration is not mitigated). 33 
 34 
  35 
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1. Introduction 36 
A Bayes factor is a form of statistical inference in which one model, say H1, is pitted against 37 
another, say H0. Both models need to be specified, even if in a default way. Significance testing 38 
(using only the p-value for inference, as per Fisher, 1935) involves setting up a model for H0 alone – 39 
and yet is typically still used to pit H0 against H1. I will argue that significance testing is in this way 40 
flawed, with harmful consequences for the practice of science (Wagenmakers, 2007). Bayes factors, 41 
by specifying two models, resolve several key problems (though not all problems). After defining a 42 
Bayes factor, the introduction first indicates the general consequences of having two models 43 
(namely, the ability to obtain evidence for the null hypothesis; and the fact the alternative has to be 44 
specified well enough to make predictions). Then the body of the paper explores four ways in which 45 
these consequences may change the practice of science for the better. 46 
1.1 What is a Bayes factor? 47 
In order to define a Bayes factor, the following equation can be derived with a few steps 48 
from the axioms of probability (e.g. Stone, 2013): Normative posterior belief in one theory versus 49 
another in the light of data = a Bayes factor, B × prior belief in one theory versus another.  That is, 50 
whatever strength of belief one happened to have in different theories prior to data (which will be 51 
different for different people), that belief should be updated by the same amount, B, for everyone1. 52 
What this equation tells us is that if we measure strength of evidence of data as the amount by 53 
which anyone should change their strength of belief in the two theories in the light of the data, then 54 
the only relevant information is provided by the Bayes factor, B (cf Birnbaum, 1962). Conventional 55 
approximate guidelines for strength of evidence were provided by Jeffreys (1939; though Bayes 56 
factors stand on their own as continuous measures of degrees of evidence).  If B > 3 then there is 57 
substantial evidence for H1 rather than H0; if B < 1/3 then there is substantial evidence for H0 rather 58 
than H1; and if B is in between 1/3 and 3 then the evidence is insensitive. 59 
The term ‘prior’ has two meanings in the context of Bayes factors. P(H1) is a prior probability 60 
of H1, i.e. how much you believe in H1 before seeing the data. But the term ‘prior’ is also used to 61 
refer to setting up the model of H1, i.e. to state what the theory predicts, used for obtaining P(D|H1), 62 
the probability of obtaining the data given the theory.  When measuring strength of evidence with 63 
Bayes factors, there is no need to specify priors in the first sense; but there is a need to specify a 64 
model (prior in the second sense). To know how much evidence supports a theory one must know 65 
what the theory predicts; but one doesn’t have to know how much one believes in a theory a priori. 66 
In this paper, specifying what a theory predicts will be called a ‘model’. 67 
1.2 The consequences of having two models 68 
                                                          
1 In symbols: 
P(H1|D) / P(H0|D)   =   P(D|H1) / P(D|H0)  × P(H1)/P(H0) 
P(H1)/P(H0) is the ratio of the probabilities (or strength of belief) in H1 versus H0, i.e. the prior odds of H1 
versus H0.  P(H1/D)/P(H0|D) is the ratio of the probabilities of the two theories in the light of the data; i.e. the 
posterior odds. The remaining term is the Bayes factor, B, which states that the data are B times more 
probable under H1 rather than H0. Briefly, posterior odds = B × prior odds. 
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The specification of two models in a Bayesian approach, rather than one in significance 69 
testing, has two direct consequences: One is that Bayes factors are symmetric in a way that p-values 70 
are asymmetric; and, second, Bayes factors relate theory to data in a direct way that is not possible 71 
with p-values. Here I clarify what these two properties mean; then the paper will consider in detail 72 
how these properties are important for how we do science. 73 
First, a Bayes factor, unlike a p-value, is a continuous degree of evidence that can 74 
symmetrically favour one model or another (e.g. Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). 75 
Let’s call the models H1 and H0.  By using conventional criteria, the Bayes factor can indicate 76 
whether evidence is weak or strong. Thus, the Bayes factor may indicate (i) strong evidence for H1 77 
and against H0; or (ii) strong evidence for H0 and against H1; or (iii) not much evidence either way. 78 
That is a Bayes factor can make a three-way distinction.  A p-value, by contrast, is asymmetric. A 79 
small p-value (often) indicates evidence against H0 and for the H1 of interest; but a large p-value 80 
does not distinguish evidence for H0 from not much evidence for anything. A p-value only tries to 81 
make a two-way distinction: evidence against H0 (i.e. i) versus anything else (i.e. ii or iii, without 82 
distinguishing them) (and even this it does not do very well; Lindley, 1957). A large p-value is, 83 
therefore, never in itself evidence for H0. The asymmetry of p-values leads to many problems that 84 
are part of the ‘credibility crisis’ in science (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). The reason why p-values 85 
are asymmetric is that they specify only one model: H0. This is their simplicity and hence their 86 
beguiling beauty. But their simplicity is simplistic. This paper will argue that using Bayes factors will 87 
therefore help solve some (but not all) of the problems leading to the credibility crisis, by changing 88 
scientific practice. The symmetry is particularly important in determining support for the null 89 
hypothesis, interpreting replications, and p-hacking by optional stopping, all practical issues 90 
discussed below.  91 
The strict use of only one model is Fisherian; Neyman and Pearson (1967) argued that two 92 
models should be used, and introduced the concept of power, which helps introduce symmetry in 93 
inference, in that it provides grounds for asserting the null hypothesis. Unfortunately power is a 94 
flawed solution (Dienes, 2014) and that might explain why it is not always taken up. Power cannot 95 
be determined based on the actual data in order to assess their sensitivity; hence, a high powered 96 
non-significant result might not actually be evidence for the null hypothesis, as we shall see. Further, 97 
it involves (or should involve) specifying only the minimal interesting effect size, which is a rather 98 
incomplete specification of H1 (and it is the aspect of H1 most difficult to make in many cases). In 99 
practice, psychologists are happy to assert null hypotheses even when power has not been 100 
calculated, and inference is based on p-values alone (as we shall see). 101 
The second consequence of having to specify H1 as well as H0 is that thought must be given 102 
to what one’s theory actually predicts (Vanpaemel, 2010). In this way, Bayes factors allow a more 103 
intimate connection between theory and data than p-values allow. This issue is particularly 104 
important for dealing with issues of multiple testing and the timing of theorising versus collecting 105 
data. I conjecture that a Bayesian view of these issues will lead to a more probing exploration of 106 
theory than significance testing encourages, a point taken up at the end. 107 
The paper now considers in detail the specific changes to scientific practice the use of Bayes 108 
factors may bring about. Specifically it considers, in order, issues of obtaining support for the null 109 
hypothesis; of the effect of stopping rules on error rates; of dealing with multiple comparisons in 110 
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theory evaluation; and, finally, of planned versus post hoc tests and the role of timing of theory and 111 
data in scientific inference.  I will argue that Bayesian inference compared to significance testing 112 
leads to a re-evaluation of all these issues. 113 
2. Changes to scientific practice 114 
2.1. Supporting the null hypothesis. 115 
Here we consider in turn the problem of providing support for the null hypothesis; how Bayes 116 
factors help; and why the orthodox solution of using power does not solve the problem, as 117 
illustrated by high powered attempts to replicate studies. 118 
The problem. The key problem created by the asymmetry of the p-value is that significance testing 119 
per se (i.e. inference by use of p-values) cannot provide evidence for the null hypothesis. Indeed, 120 
that is exactly how p-values are asymmetric. Despite that, a non-significant result is often in practice 121 
taken as evidence for a null hypothesis. For example, to take one of the most prestigious journals in 122 
psychology, in the 2014 April issue of the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, in 32 out of 123 
the 34 articles, a non-significant result was taken as support for a null hypothesis (as shown by the 124 
authors claiming no effect), with no further grounds given for accepting the null other than that the 125 
p-value was greater than .05. That is, in the vast majority of the articles where there were no 126 
grounds for accepting the null hypothesis at all, the null hypothesis was nonetheless accepted, often 127 
in order to draw important theoretical conclusions. The effect of this practice can be disastrous. For 128 
example, the drug paroxetine was originally declared to have no risk of increased suicide in children 129 
because the increase of risk was non-significant (it was later shown to have such a risk, Goldacre, 130 
2013). Human death aside, do we want to guide our theory development partly on conclusions that 131 
are groundless2? 132 
Researchers may know that inferring the null hypothesis from a non-significant result is 133 
suspect. That obviously does not stop the practice from happening, it just makes sure it happens 134 
freely in papers where there also are also key significant results. But where the key result is non-135 
significant, papers are less likely to be published (Rosenthal, 1979; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 136 
2014). The research record becomes a misleading representation of the evidence. Because the p-137 
value is asymmetric, people seek to get the evidence in the only way it can appear to be strong – as 138 
against H0. Thus, apart from failure to publish relevant evidence concerning a theory, another 139 
outcome is p-hacking: Pushing the data in the one direction it can for it to be recognised as strong 140 
evidence, by use of analytic flexibility (John,  Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Masicampo, & Lalande, 141 
2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). No wonder there is a crisis in the credibility of our 142 
published results.  143 
How Bayes factors help. Bayes factors partly solve the problem by allowing the evidence to go both 144 
ways. This means you can tell when there is evidence for the null hypothesis and against the 145 
alternative: You can tell when there is good evidence against there being a treatment side effect 146 
(and when the evidence is just weak);  you can tell when the data count against a theory (and when 147 
they count for nothing); and there is every reason to publish evidence supporting the null as going 148 
                                                          
2 The sample difference being small, zero, or in the wrong direction does not in itself provide sufficient grounds 
either; see Dienes (2014) for examples. 
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against it, because the evidence can be measured to be just as strong either way (thus the published 149 
record can be balanced). In fact, the Bayes factor is the only way for indicating the strength of 150 
evidence for a point null hypothesis (though for a Bayes factor H0 need not be a point value; Dienes, 151 
2014; Morey & Rouder, 2011). People can still “B-hack” (i.e. massage data to get a Bayes factor just 152 
beyond some conventional threshold by the use of analytic flexibility), but we will explore how 153 
options are more limited than for p-hacking in important ways.  154 
Power and replication. Replications are hard to evaluate by reference to p-values. If an original 155 
result was significant, and a direct replication non-significant, it might feel like a failure to replicate. 156 
But as p-values cannot indicate whether the null hypothesis is supported, a non-significant 157 
replication tells one nothing in itself. This is even true for high powered non-significant replications. 158 
The point can be illustrated conceptually by considering a high powered replication where both H0 159 
and H1 specify point values. If the sample mean is exactly half way between H0 and H1, then no 160 
matter what the power, the data do not discriminate the theories in any way. In fact, if in a non-161 
significant experiment, the sample mean were closer to H1 than H0, the data would support H1 162 
more than H0 no matter how highly powered the experiment. Thus, it is rational to consider how the 163 
data actually come out to consider what they say, and power cannot do this.  164 
Most theories allow more than just one point value; then Bayes factors can be used to 165 
specify the strength of evidence. For example, consider the Reproducibility Project 166 
(https://osf.io/ezcuj/) spearheaded by Brian Nosek (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The aim was 167 
to establish how well 100 experiments published in 2008 in high impact journals in psychology 168 
replicate, when the exact methods specified are followed as closely as possible.  In the replication of 169 
Correll (2008) by Lebel (https://osf.io/fejxb/wiki/home/), the original “PSD slope” reported in the 170 
Correll paper (Study 2) was .18, SE = .077,  F(1, 68) = 5.52, p < .02. The attempted direct replication 171 
doubled sample size to achieve a power of 85%. The slope in the replication was 0.05, SE = .056, F(1, 172 
145) = 0.79, p = .37. This looks like a “failure” to replicate. In fact, calculating a Bayes factor (see 173 
Dienes, 2014, 2015a, for details of how to calculate), BH(0, .18) = 0.69, indicating that the evidence is 174 
weak and does not substantially support either H0 or H1 (the value of B is between 1/3 and 3)3.  175 
In case it is thought that 85% power just isn’t good enough, consider the replication of Estes, 176 
Verges, and Barsalou (2008). These original authors found an incongruent priming condition caused 177 
more errors than a congruent condition, the difference being 4.8%, SE = 1.6%, F(1, 17) = 9.33, p 178 
= .007. Renkewitz and Muller (https://osf.io/vwnit/) attempted an exact replication with a power of 179 
well over 95% for detecting this error difference. In the replication, they found a difference in errors 180 
of 1.4%, SE = 1.1%, F(1, 21) = 1.45, p = 0.24. This is non-significant and hence a “failure” to replicate. 181 
However, BH(0, 4.8) = 0.79, indicating the evidence was not discriminating between H0 and H1: There 182 
                                                          
3 Meta-analytic combined estimates should be analysed with Bayes factors too (Dienes, 2014; Rouder & Morey, 
2011). In this case, the fixed effect combined mean estimate of Study 2 of Correll (2008) and the replication 
is .095, SE = .0453, t(213) = 2.10. In Study 1 of Correll the PDS slope was .18; Study 2 sought to manipulate this 
slope, and .18 remains a useful scale for predicting effects in Study 2 and the replication.  On the combined 
data of Study 2 and the replication, BH(0, .18) = 3.78, substantial support for H1 with all data combined. (BH(0, .18)  
indicates that H1 was represented as a half-normal with a mode of zero and a standard deviation of 0.18; that 
is, the population difference is represented as being between 0 and roughly 2×0.18. See Dienes, 2014, for 
explanation.)  The Bayesian version of meta-analysis enjoys all the advantages of Bayesian inference in general; 
for example, it allows one to obtain support for a null hypothesis, not possible with a meta-analysis using 
significance testing. 
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are no grounds for changing one’s confidence in either H0 or H1 to any substantial degree based on 183 
the replication. On the other hand, it is quite possible to get evidence for the null using a Bayes 184 
factor in experiments with such numbers of participants; in the same replication, the effect on 185 
reaction times, which was significant in the original paper (a 37 ms effect, SE = 6ms, F(1, 17) = 40.19, 186 
p <  .001), was non-significant in the replication (0.2 ms, SE = 6ms, F(1, 21) = .001, p = 0.5), and also 187 
BH(0,37) = .19 (i.e. B < 1/3), with 22 subjects, indicating substantial support for the null. The point is 188 
that knowing power alone is not enough; once the data are in, the obtained evidence needs to be 189 
assessed for how sensitively H0 is distinguished from H1, and power cannot do this (Dienes, 2014).  190 
(Compare Etz, 2015, for a Bayesian analysis of the experiments in the Reproducibility Project.) 191 
In sum, Bayes factors would enable a more informed evaluation of replications than p-values 192 
allow. The need for more direct replications is clear (Pashler & Harris, 2012); but replications are no 193 
good if one cannot properly evaluate the results. 194 
Now we will consider some inferential paradoxes. The asymmetry of p-values leads to a 195 
sensitivity to stopping rules which is inferentially paradoxical, because the same data and theories 196 
can be evaluated differently depending on the intentions inside the head of the experimenter (e.g. r 197 
(e.g. Berger & Wolpert, 1988).  We now consider this and other inferential paradoxes that allow p-198 
hacking. The paradoxes mean that inferential outcome depends on more than the actual data 199 
obtained, and may depend on things which are in practice unknowable (the intentions and thoughts 200 
of experimenters; see Dienes, 2011 for explanation).  The need to correct for multiple testing with 201 
significance testing is a paradox in that theories may pass or fail tests on data collected that was 202 
irrelevant to the theory, but corrected for anyway. Instead Bayesian approaches in which the model 203 
of H1 is informed by scientific context focus only on the relation between theory and the data that 204 
bear on specifically that theory. Similarly, the use of timing of theory versus data as inferentially 205 
relevant in itself disguises what is actually very important about pre-registration of studies, as we 206 
will discuss. 207 
 208 
2.2 The stopping rule  209 
First we consider the problem, how stopping rules influence error rates, and thus allow cheating; 210 
then, we consider how this problem is side-stepped by Bayes factors; then finally we consider how 211 
stopping rules can lead to biased estimates, and the Bayesian answer to this problem. 212 
The problem.  Imagine that after each addition of an observation to data, a p-value is calculated. If 213 
H0 is false, the p-value is driven towards small values. However, if H0 is true, the p-value does a 214 
random walk. That means sooner or later, if H0 is true, the p-value will randomly wander below .05 215 
(Rouder et al., 2009). So if one uses significance testing, it is strictly forbidden to keep topping up 216 
participants, without a pre-planned correction – yet John et al. (2012) estimate that virtually 100% of 217 
psychologists at major US universities have topped up participants after initially failing to get a 218 
significant result.  If one decides to continue running until a significant result is obtained, significance 219 
is guaranteed even if H0 is true. Thus, one has to decide on the conditions one would stop in 220 
advance of collecting data – and then stop at that point. By contrast, a Bayes factor B is symmetric. If 221 
H0 is false, then, in the long run, B is driven upwards. If H0 is true, B is driven towards zero. Because 222 
B is driven in opposite directions dependent on which theory is true, when using a Bayes factor one 223 
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can stop collecting data whenever one likes (Savage, 1962). Thus, use of Bayes factors respects the 224 
“stopping rule principle” according to which the only evidence about a parameter is contained in the 225 
data and not the stopping rule used to collect them (Berger & Berry, 1988a,b; Berger & Wolpert, 226 
1988). 227 
A useful rule would be to stop collecting data when either B is greater than 3 or less than 1/3; 228 
then one has guaranteed an informative conclusion with a minimum number of participants (cf. 229 
Schoenbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini, in press). (Something which power cannot 230 
guarantee: A study can be high-powered but still the data do not discriminate between the models.) 231 
While significance testing allows p-hacking by optional stopping, one cannot B-hack by optional 232 
stopping. 233 
The possibility that one can legitimately ignore the stopping rule would be such a dramatic 234 
and useful change to practice, that it might seem too good to be true. Consider the following 235 
argument for why the conclusion might be false. The value of B, as any statistic, is subject to noise, 236 
and surely one can capitalize on that noise by stopping for example when B > 3 (if it were to be), 237 
even when H0 is true?  Indeed, Yu, Sprenger, Thomas, and Dougherty (2014) and Sanborn and Hills 238 
(2014) showed that one could indeed substantially raise the false alarm rate for B when H0 was true 239 
by using just such a stopping rule. The effect can be illustrated even with a symmetric stopping rule. 240 
Imagine an experiment where each participant provides a difference score, say their cognitive 241 
performance with and without a cognitive enhancer. We have prior information that implies that if 242 
there were to be an effect of a cognitive enhancer, it would be about one point for the dependent 243 
variable used. Following Dienes (2014), H1 is modelled as a half-normal with an SD of the expected 244 
size of effect (i.e. 1).  For simplicity, assume the population standard deviation of scores is 1. When 245 
running for a fixed 100 trials, simulation of the experiment 1000 times (see Appendix 1 for details)  246 
showed that when H0 was true, B exceeded three 1% of the time, and B was less than a third 86% of 247 
the time. That is the false alarm rate was only 1%.  248 
Table 1 indicates what happened when the stopping rule was as follows: After every 249 
participant, check to see if either B > 3 or else B < 1/3. I f so, stop. Otherwise run another participant 250 
and continue until either the threshold is crossed or else 100 subjects are reached. In terms of 251 
researcher practice, this is a worst case scenario; researchers do not typically check after every 252 
participant, but maybe only two or three times when the initial result is non-significant; see Dienes 253 
Dienes (2011) for why the latter practice is wrong when uncorrected for orthodox statistics (and see 254 
Sagarin, Ambler, & Lee, 2014, for appropriate corrections).  Each number in Table 1 is the outcome 255 
of 200 simulations. Appendix 1 gives the R code. Appendix shows the results for different types of 256 
Bayes factors. Notice that when the same threshold for B (i.e. three/a third) is used as for our 257 
example with a fixed number of subjects in the last paragraph, the false alarm rate for when H0 was 258 
true increased from 1% to 14%. That is, the stopping rule affected the false alarm rate of the Bayes 259 
factor. Does this not contradict the claim that inference using B is immune to the stopping rule? 260 
 261 
 262 
 263 
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 265 
 Threshold : 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population 
effect : 
         
dz = 0 
 
Reject H0 14 12 11 11 7 7  6 5 
Accept H0 86 87  86 86 85 79 74 69 
 
 
dz = 1 
 
Reject H0 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Accept H0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 266 
Table 1  267 
Per cent decision rates for accepting/rejecting H0 for BH(0,1) (i.e. a Bayes factor in which H1 268 
has been represented as a half-normal, with mode = 0, and SD  = 1). Each participant provides a 269 
single difference score, sampled from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 1. Thus, the 270 
specified population effect sizes are dz’s (Cohen, 1988). Maximum number of participants before 271 
stopping (MaxN) = 100; minimum number of participants before checking after every trial (MinN) = 1. 272 
H0 is rejected if B exceeds the stated threshold, and accepted if B goes below 1/threshold. 273 
 274 
Why the stopping rule is a not a problem for Bayes factors. Rouder (2014) argued elegantly for why 275 
the sensitivity of the false alarm rate to the stopping rule is consistent with inference from B 276 
remaining immune to the stopping rule. Here the same argument will be put slightly differently. First 277 
notice that the equation ‘posterior odds  = B*prior odds’ follows from the axioms of probability.  278 
That is, given that the axioms normatively specify how the strength of belief should be changed, B is 279 
normatively the amount by which the strength of belief should be changed regardless of the 280 
stopping rule. If strength of evidence is measured by how much in principle beliefs should 281 
normatively be changed, then B is normatively the measure of strength of evidence discriminating 282 
two theories. The stopping rule does not come into the equation, so the claim is true regardless of 283 
the stopping rule. But how does this fit with false alarm changing according to the stopping rule?  284 
Notice that B is the measure of evidence regardless of the specific value of P(D|H0). That is, 285 
P(D|H0) can in principle vary as B stays the same.  B will still be the measure of strength of evidence 286 
– because P(D|H1) will change by just the right amount.  Experimental psychologists are used to 287 
such reasoning with signal detection theory. Discriminability in a perceptual decision task can remain 288 
the same as bias changes; we would never dream of measuring discriminability by measuring the 289 
false alarm rate in a signal detection experiment. Obviously the same point applies to H0 versus H1. 290 
That is, false alarm rate of a procedure can change when discriminating H0 versus H1 even when the 291 
ability of the procedure to discriminate remains invariant. The evidence provided by an observation 292 
remains the same even if the criterion is changed (and hence false alarm rate changes). B is the 293 
invariant measure of the strength of evidence for H1 versus H0, regardless of false alarm rate. 294 
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We as experimental psychologists have become fixed on false alarm rate for measuring the 295 
strength of evidence for a theory because we were taught to consider only one model (H0) for 296 
significance testing. It is like trying to perform signal detection theory with only one distribution, that 297 
for noise alone. But in signal detection theory terms, that is a nonsense; we need the signal 298 
distribution as well. Bayes considers two distributions: One for H0 and one for H1. False alarm rate is, 299 
by itself, uninformative about how well the theories are discriminated. 300 
The Supplementary Materials4 give R code for measuring the false alarm and hit rates for 301 
Bayes factors for optional stopping. One can vary, amongst other things, the threshold, population 302 
effect sizes, and the minimum or maximum number of participants before optional stopping can 303 
begin. Table 2 shows the same situation as Table 1, but with a minimum of 10 participants before 304 
optional stopping could start. The false alarm rate for a threshold of three is halved (see first column 305 
in Table 2 compared to Table 1). B will be most variable early on in testing, because B is driven in 306 
different directions according to which theory is true as data accumulates. Once B has picked up 307 
momentum in the right direction, it may never exceed a value in the opposite direction, even after 308 
an infinite number of participants (Savage, 1962). Thus, having a minimum number of participants, 309 
even a small amount, can reduce false alarm rate. Note that B is always and invariably the correct 310 
measure of strength of evidence for discriminating H0 versus H1, regardless of whether a minimum 311 
number of participants is used.  Nonetheless if one wanted to control false alarm rate, in addition to 312 
discriminability, the Supplementary Materials would allow the reader to work out how to do so by, 313 
for example, changing the minimum number of participants, or raising the threshold of B. (There is 314 
another reason to run a minimum number of participants: The validity of the Bayes factor, as for any 315 
statistical test, depends on the assumptions of the statistical model being approximately true. A 316 
minimum number of participants allows assumptions to be checked; Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 317 
2013).  The Supplementary Materials also provide results for different types of Bayes factors. 318 
  319 
 Threshold : 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population 
effect: 
         
dz = 0 
 
Reject H0 7 7 7 5 5 3  4 3 
Accept H0 93 91 88 81 83 82 73 66 
 
dz = 1 
 
Reject H0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Accept H0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 320 
Table 2  321 
Per cent decision rates for accepting/rejecting H0 for BH(0,1) as for Table 1, except that MinN 322 
= 10. 323 
                                                          
4  
http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/Supplementary%20materials%20for%20How%20Bayes% 
20factors%20change%20our%20science.pdf 
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The Appendix illustrates how Bayes factors have better error properties as a function of the 324 
stopping rule not only than significance testing, but also than the use of confidence or credibility 325 
intervals. 326 
In sum, Bayes factors can be used as a measure of evidence irrespective of the stopping rule, 327 
and hence optional stopping is not a form of B-hacking. In fact stopping when B > 3 or < 1/3 (or any 328 
other threshold) would enable stopping when the data are just as discriminating as needed. This 329 
guarantees the sensitivity of a study with a minimum of participants. 330 
The issue of bias. It might be argued that, although Bayes factors are insensitive to the stopping rule 331 
as a measure of evidence, the estimates of population values can be biased by the stopping rule. 332 
Thus, we could be in the seemingly awkward position of having fine inferential statistics but biased 333 
descriptive statistics, depending on the stopping rule. To illustrate bias arising according to the 334 
stopping rule, if a researcher was interested in the effect of a drug on mood, she could decide to 335 
stop testing after she found three participants in a row who were happier on the drug than on 336 
placebo. The resulting estimate of how happy the drug made people would be biased upwards. Bias 337 
is a frequentist notion that therefore needs a reference class to define it; the reference class in this 338 
case is defined by the stopping rule. That is, let the researcher repeat the experiment an infinite 339 
number of times (and to allow the argument to be clear, assume the researcher can be taken as 340 
randomly sampling from the same population as before), each time stopping the experiment after 341 
three participants in a row were happier on the drug than on placebo. Even if the drug were 342 
ineffective, each estimate would have a tendency to indicate that people were happier on the drug; 343 
that is, the mean of all the estimates would show greater happiness on the drug than on the placebo. 344 
Isn’t this a problem for an experiment, even if analysed by Bayesian statistics?  345 
The clue to the solution is that bias is inherently a frequentist notion, with need of a 346 
reference class (Howson & Urbach, 2006); yet it is the use of reference classes that leads to the 347 
inferential paradoxes in significance testing that do not apply to Bayesian analyses (Lindley, 1971; 348 
Dienes, 2011). Our researcher, as a Bayesian, would not simply average the results of the different 349 
experiments together (in an unweighted way). The experiments are all basic events in the reference 350 
class; but a Bayesian does not recognize the reference class as relevant to inference. Note that each 351 
experiment would have a different number of participants. The events in the reference class are just 352 
one arbitrary way of carving up the full set of data (as given by stringing together the infinite number 353 
of experiments the researcher runs).  Different stopping rules (defining different reference classes) 354 
would partition the same full set of data into different events. The same data could be partitioned 355 
such that each experiment finished with three people in a row who were happier on placebo rather 356 
than drug (now the bias goes the other way). But all that matters is the complete data set, not the 357 
arbitrary partitionings of it. The experimenter should combine all her participants together, and then 358 
average such that each participant contributes equally. This procedure (of averaging over 359 
participants all the data that one has so far) converges in the limit to the correct value of the 360 
population mean (cf Rouder, 2014). The frequentist by contrast has to work within the reference 361 
class predefined by her, and so bias is a genuine worry: By frequentist methods, the average (over 362 
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reference class events) converges to the correct value only if the stopping rule provides unbiased 363 
estimates5.  364 
To recap: The stopping rule can introduce bias to estimates when the expected value of the 365 
estimate is taken over the events of a reference class; but such bias is irrelevant to Bayesian 366 
procedures, whether theory testing (Bayes factors) or estimating population parameters. Bayes 367 
factors would change scientific practice because hacking by optional stopping would be ruled out. 368 
Given the prevalence of optional stopping (John et al., 2012), this would produce a major change in 369 
the robustness of our science. 370 
 371 
2.3. Corrections for multiple testing 372 
First we consider the problem that multiple testing gives multiple opportunities for errors, yet 373 
correcting for this introduces inferential arbitrariness; then we consider the Bayesian solution, which 374 
removes arbitrariness. 375 
The problem. One way people can cheat with inferential statistics is to make many comparisons and 376 
then focus on the one that was significant taken on its own.  The frequentist solution is to correct for 377 
multiple testing.  If with frequentist statistics one decides to correct for familywise error rate, the 378 
correction depends on an arbitrary specification of what the family is, allowing analytic flexibility (for 379 
evidence of wide spread prevalence of problems created by flexibility in defining relevant families, 380 
see Ioannidis, Munafò, Fusar-Poli, Nosek et al., 2014;  John et al., 2012) . With Bayes the issue 381 
becomes one of specifying how different theories are affected by all the data relevant to them, 382 
which is not arbitrary.  We consider an imaginary example to illustrate the issues and their solution. 383 
An example is now presented in order to consider the issue of families of tests. Six studies 384 
are run testing the effect of referring to the general concept of “closing” on how quickly a sale is 385 
closed (i.e. how quickly the sale is agreed and completed). The maximum time allocated to the sale 386 
was 5 minutes in each study. A previous priming study using a the same selling paradigm, but 387 
priming by seating the client in soft vs hard chairs, obtained a priming effect of 15 seconds. Thus, 388 
based on the past study, in the current experiment one might expect a priming effect of on the order 389 
of magnitude of roughly 15 seconds if priming existed (so we can model H1 as a half normal with an 390 
SD of 15 seconds, following Dienes 2014). In one study frequent verbal reference was made by the 391 
salesperson to closed doors compared to a control condition; in another condition the salesperson 392 
incidentally discussed Sunday closing rules; and, for example, in the final study, the salesperson 393 
made frequent hand gestures reminiscent of a closing door.  Each condition had its own matched 394 
                                                          
5 It may seem that the Bayesian solution of weighting according to participant number is open to the 
frequentist; indeed, the frequentist may complain that the solution I provide above is just as frequentist as 
Bayesian. But the frequentist is conceptually obliged to respect reference classes even in meta-analyses. 
Consider Smith performing a study which obtained p = .08 and publishing. Jones, based on Smith’s p-value 
being tantalizing close to .05, runs 20 more participants, and combines the data together in a meta-analysis. 
The resulting meta-analytic p =.04 is not significant at the 5% level just because it was Jones who topped up 
and not Smith (see section 2.1 1; so long as Jones topping up is conditional on the p-value obtained by Smith, 
the overall error rate of the Jones-Smith pair is above 5%). Frequentists may intuitively grasp for Bayesian 
solutions, but that does not make the frequentist version legitimate (for a similar argument for confidence vs 
credibility intervals, see Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2015). 
13 
 
control. In one of the studies, the one with hand gestures of closing doors, reference to closure 395 
indeed resulted in faster closure of the sale as compared to its control condition (with opening hand 396 
gestures), mean effect = 10 seconds, SE = 5 seconds, t(30) = 2.0, p  <  .05.  BH(0,15) = 3.72, indicating 397 
substantial evidence for the effect of priming as opposed to the null hypothesis. None of the other 398 
studies were significant, nor had Bayes factors above 3. 399 
A researcher might be tempted to report only the one study that worked. It did after all 400 
involve the most embodied references to closing (bodily hand gestures rather than word primes), 401 
and it might be presumed, that’s why that particular study worked. The other studies, which were all 402 
different in a possibly relevant way, had therefore not found the right conditions for eliciting the 403 
effect6. This type of reasoning is very tempting and there must be a place for it in exploration. Often 404 
researchers explore the conditions for eliciting an effect before they find conditions that appear to 405 
work. Nonetheless, choosing one study from many is cherry picking. It is cherry picking because the 406 
other studies must have been designed in the first place because it was felt they did test the general 407 
theory that priming closure speeds closure.  And when relevant data have not been reported 408 
because the results looked better without them, Bayes factors in themselves cannot make up for 409 
that systematic exclusion. So if only the one “successful” study were reported, both Bayesian and 410 
conventional statistics would inappropriately show the evidence to be stronger than it actually was 411 
for the general theory that priming “closing” speeds the closing of sales. (Pre-registration of studies, 412 
by itself neither Bayesian nor non-Bayesian, is a key solution to this problem; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 413 
Borsboom, van der Maas, et al., 2012.) That is, bias introduced by the judicious dropping of 414 
conditions, discussed by Simons et al. (2011), is not in itself solved by using Bayesian methods on the 415 
data that remains.  Bayesian analyses will not solve all forms of bias (and then only the ones that are 416 
part of the formal statistical problem; Jaynes, 2003). A Bayesian analysis requires that all relevant 417 
data are included. 418 
In fact, say that the authors report all studies, so cherry picking is avoided. What is the 419 
evidential value of the final study showing an effect? The orthodox approach corrects for multiple 420 
testing. Thus, if all studies are taken as a family, a threshold of .05/6 = .008 may be used for p-values, 421 
now rendering the final study non-significant at the 5% level:  The presence of an effect cannot be 422 
asserted for the embodied priming manipulation. However, from a Bayesian point of view, the 423 
evidence provided by the data from specifically the final study for the hypothesis that embodied 424 
primes are effective remains the same, no matter what other procedures are tested. The Bayes 425 
factor remains 3.72 for the evidential worth of the data from the final study, noteworthy evidence 426 
for H1 concerning this particular procedure. Isn’t this a problem for Bayes?  427 
Before considering the Bayesian solution, first note the flexibility in the frequentist one. 428 
Families do not have to be defined by theoretical question in frequentist statistics, and indeed often 429 
are not (they may e.g. be defined by degrees of freedom in an omnibus test, e.g. Keppel & Zedeck, 430 
1989). By contrast, the Bayesian solution is to consider the evidence for each theory. In frequentist 431 
terms there is no reason why families could not be made of various subsets of the studies. In 432 
frequentist terms if the sixth study was treated as planned it could be tested separately from the 433 
others, which are then each corrected at the .05/5 level as one family. We will consider planned vs 434 
                                                          
6 A test of the difference between embodied (mean = 10, SE = 5) and the others (mean = 0, SE = 5/√5 = 2.2), 
t(180) = 1.82, ns; BH(0,15) = 2.83, indicates only anecdotal evidence for a difference. 
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post hoc tests below. For now we consider how Bayes just depends on the relation of the data to 435 
theories. 436 
Why multiple comparisons are not a problem for Bayes factors. The priming technique used in the 437 
final study is a variant of a number of different priming techniques addressing a common question. 438 
Let us say the mean priming effect for the other studies was 0. Now the overall priming effect across 439 
all studies is (10 +0)/6 = 1.7.  For simplicity, assume all studies had identical standard deviations and 440 
Ns. The standard error for the overall mean effect is 5/√6 = 2.2.   Thus, BH(0,15) = 0.30, support for the 441 
null hypothesis that priming closure does not lead to faster closures. In evaluating the general theory 442 
that priming closure speeds closure, all relevant data must be used. And when all data is used, the 443 
data sensitively support the null hypothesis (using for illustration the guidelines of e.g. Jeffreys, 1939, 444 
for interpreting the size of Bayes factors, though note Bayes factors stand by themselves as 445 
continuous degrees of evidence). 446 
The theory that embodied primes of closure speeds closure can be regarded as a specific or 447 
subordinate level theory of a general or superordinate level theory that priming closure speeds 448 
closure. Here the specific theory received substantial evidence considered on its own, while the 449 
general theory overall had substantial evidence against it. Naturally, in specific cases evidence 450 
pointed in somewhat different directions, as evidence will; but taken together, the evidence was 451 
clearly against the general theory.  Note there was no need to correct for multiple comparisons; we 452 
just had to take account all evidence directly testing a given theory. (Scientific judgment will always 453 
determine the relevant specific and general theories.) 454 
Bayes factors enable a properly nuanced extraction of information from data, unlike 455 
significance testing. That is, Bayesian inference reflects the fact there is evidence for a specific 456 
theory, while the data as a whole count against the more general theory. If one had independent 457 
reasons for thinking embodiment was especially important for making priming effective, more data 458 
could be collected, using the manipulation of the final study, until the evidence for both the 459 
subordinate and superordinate theories was convincing one way or the other. That is, publishing 460 
support for both the subordinate and superordindate theories (and showing statistically that 461 
embodiment was better than non-embodiment) would require more data than currently on the 462 
table. On the other hand, if previous research indicated that word and embodied primes were 463 
roughly similar in efficacy in other domains, one could simply go with the evidence for the 464 
superordinate theory, and regard it as substantially weakened by the data. 465 
The same logic can be applied generally to cases where multiple tests are applied, all bearing 466 
on a common superordinate theory. Consider collecting data on a vast number of EEG and ERP 467 
measures on meditators and matched non-meditators, hoping to find indicators of superior 468 
attentional abilities in meditators than non-meditators. (So the scientific question has set the 469 
relevant superordinate hypothesis.) “Attentional ability” could manifest itself in a large number of 470 
different ways: More theta density? Larger P300 amplitudes? And on and on. The problem this 471 
design raises is that conclusions could rely on cherry picking a few EEG measures that came out as 472 
expected, and ignoring all those that gave non-significant results. Without corrections for multiple 473 
testing, how could Bayesian analyses protect against seeing patterns in noise? Here is one way to 474 
proceed. First specify what dependent variables measure attention, or the sort of attention we may 475 
be interested in. Then devise a way of meta-analytically combining all those measures into a single 476 
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one. Finally test the strength of evidence that the overall measure provides for the superordinate 477 
theory that meditators have stronger attentional skills than non-meditators. Combining evidence is 478 
not peculiarly Bayesian (though combining evidence to obtain an overall strength of evidence is). But 479 
the procedure does show why Bayesian inference leads to sensible answers when it comes to 480 
multiple testing situations. When our real interest is in a general theory, we must assess all evidence 481 
for that theory. By realizing that non-significant results may carry evidential value, Bayesian 482 
inference encourages researches to use all available data. Significance testing can encourage 483 
ignoring non-significant results as non-evidential and hence cherry picking the significant ones7. 484 
For another example, consider finding evidence for a difference in activation between 485 
conditions in one tiny voxel in an fMRI study. If that voxel is structurally and theoretically arbitrary, it 486 
means nothing for theory development. Results mean nothing except in so far as they inform 487 
interesting theory. The question is, when we combine activation across theoretically and structurally 488 
meaningful sets of voxels, what remains of the evidence? (And as soon as you construct a 489 
meaningful theory about what is going on, consider what other voxels are now implicated in testing 490 
the theory. Only when all evidence relevant to the superordinate theory has been taken into account 491 
can the superordinate theory be evaluated.) 492 
The strategy suggested so far relies on using a Bayes factor to test a single degree-of-493 
freedom hypothesis. This provides a simple broadly applicable strategy but the use of Bayes factors 494 
is not limited to this strategy. A superordinate theory that specifies a rank ordering of means in 495 
different conditions can also be tested with a Bayes factor using the methods of Hoijtink (2011). For 496 
example, a theory that specified that the mean for the first and second conditions should be the 497 
same but higher than those from a third, specifies a set of ordinal constraints which together are 498 
richer than a single degree-of-freedom comparison.  An editor might be especially prepared to 499 
accept a paper in favour of or against a superordinate theory if the theory received substantial 500 
evidence as a whole (either for or against), regardless of the direction of specific cherry-picked 501 
comparisons. Of course, the single degree of freedom comparisons (first mean versus second mean; 502 
their average versus the third) would help pinpoint strength of evidence for specific claims made by 503 
the theory. 504 
So far it might be thought that Bayes does little better than significance testing in dealing 505 
with multiple testing situations (after all, in orthodox statistics one could combine evidence across 506 
situations in theory relevant ways). Bear in mind that in Bayesian inference one is not at liberty to 507 
define families at will; one has to ask about the relation of data to each specific theory of interest, so 508 
“families” must be picked out as the tests relevant to a given theory. Bayesian inference can indicate 509 
the support for or against any specified theory. But Bayesian inference can do more, by taking into 510 
account the full Bayesian apparatus that lies beyond non-Bayesian approaches. A Bayes factor 511 
represents the strength of evidence data provides for one theory rather than another. That evidence 512 
informs the posterior probabilities for the different theories. The posterior probability that 513 
embodied priming of closure is effective may be affected by the evidence for priming using words; 514 
that is, if there is priming for words it increases the probability that there could be priming from 515 
                                                          
7 When an informed model is tested, Bayesian inference requires one draw on all and only the relevant data. 
Strange as it is in hindsight, frequentist statistics just haven’t operated in that way. Frequentists could copy 
Bayesians in pooling data relevant to theories. But why not start from principles that directly lead to the right 
answer, rather than those that underspecify what to do? 
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gestures, and vice versa. The evidence from the other studies, using different priming procedures, 516 
may rationally affect the posterior probability of any one of the priming techniques working.  This is 517 
because these specific theories fall under the same general theory. Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson et 518 
al. (2013) and Kruschke (2010) describe how to set up hierarchical models whereby the posterior 519 
distributions of the means of different conditions is automatically influenced by the data from all 520 
conditions. This has the effect of making it harder to detect an effect of embodied priming if there 521 
were no priming in any other condition (cf correction for multiple testing); but easier if there were 522 
priming in other conditions. This rational adjustment cannot be done with non-Bayesian approaches. 523 
In essence the procedure provides a sort of correction for multiple testing – but not for the sake of 524 
correcting for multiple testing, but for the sake of making the most of all the relevant data8.  525 
In sum, significance testing involves arbitrary corrections for multiple testing, where there is 526 
no need to define families by the theory the data are relevant to (indeed, people are often urged to 527 
define families by other criteria, like omnibus degrees of freedom in pre-packaged statistical 528 
routines such as ANOVA ). Bayes factors (where H1 is motivated by theory) explicitly relate theories 529 
to data. It may be that specific theory receives support while a general theory is weakened (or vice 530 
versa). That is what the data say; what to do next is a matter for scientific not statistical judgment. 531 
Bayesian inference would change scientific practice because calculating a Bayes factor requires 532 
specifying two models, and thus encourages being clear about what theory the data bear on. Thus, 533 
families cannot be defined arbitrarily, but only by reference to theories of scientific interest. 534 
 535 
2.4. Planned versus post hoc tests. 536 
First we consider the problem, that the timing of theory relative to data intuitively feels important, 537 
yet correcting for it introduces inferential arbitrariness; then we consider the Bayesian solution, 538 
which removes arbitrariness. 539 
The problem. One intuition is that it is desirable to predict the precise results one obtained in 540 
advance of obtaining them. Indeed, in an estimated 92% of papers in psychology and psychiatry, the 541 
results confirm the predictions (Fanelli, 2010). Yet when the predictions are made in advance of 542 
seeing the data, the confirmation rate is considerably less (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 543 
Scientists feel a pressure to obtain confirmatory results.  For significance testing it makes a 544 
difference whether one thought of one’s theory before analysing the data or afterwards (planned 545 
versus post hoc comparisons). In Bayesian inference all that matters are the data and the theory, not 546 
their timing (because the Bayes factor depends just on the probability of the data given the theory).  547 
 At first, the Bayesian answer might seem strange. We have all read papers where when we 548 
got to the end of the introduction and read the “predictions”, we thought “You are only saying that 549 
because that is what your results are.”  We feel cheated. A post hoc result is being falsely treated as 550 
a prediction. Isn’t this wrong? But wait a minute. You knew there was a problem just by reading 551 
                                                          
8 The procedure amounts to saying there is evidence relevant to the embodiment prime beyond that 
contained in the data for just the embodiment condition. Thus, using his procedure amounts to a different 
assumption than if one just used the Bayes factor based on the embodiment data. What this evidence does is 
change the prior distribution for the embodiment prime; the posterior is thereby affected. Naturally, different 
scientific judgments concerning relevance can affect the Bayesian outcome. 
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what you had in front of you. That shows the real problem existed independently of the timing of 552 
events; the real problem was the relation of predictions to theory as evident in the paper itself. 553 
What really matters is how tightly and simply predictions follow from a simple and elegant theory. 554 
Those criteria are obviously not met by our example paper. The paper would be flawed just as much 555 
even if, in fact, the authors had thought of their predictions before looking at the data. The data are 556 
not actually likely given any stated general theory – that’s the problem. Opposite or different 557 
predictions could just as well be generated from the stated general theory (if any theory were 558 
stated). Consider an opposite case: Einstein finding that his theory of general theory, developed 559 
around 1915, explained the anomalous orbit of Mercury, known since 1859. It was a key result that 560 
helped win scientists over to his theory (Lanczos, 1974). First the result was known, then the theory 561 
was developed. But the theory had its own independent elegant motivation. What is important is 562 
the theory’s simplicity and elegance both in itself and in application to the results, not which came 563 
first. 564 
The role of timing in Bayesian inference.  Timing is a proxy or correlate of what we are really 565 
interested in: Predictions genuinely made in advance are likely to be strongly motivated by a simple 566 
theory. Post hoc predictions are likely to be arbitrarily related to simple theory. A useful rule of 567 
thumb is that confirming novel rather than post hoc predictions is more likely to provide strong 568 
evidence for a simple theory.  But that is not to do with some magic about when someone thought 569 
of a theory (someone’s brilliance in mentally penetrating the structure of Mother Nature in advance 570 
may be relevant to their self-esteem but such personal brilliance does not transfer to the evidential 571 
support of the data for the theory: In science it does not matter who you are). The objective 572 
properties of theory and data as entities in their own right (Feynman, 1998; Popper, 1963) need to 573 
be separated from accidental facts concerning when certain brains thought of the theory.  Gelman 574 
and Loken (2013) illustrate this beautifully by considering how, in a range of real examples, different 575 
results would have more simply confirmed a general theory than the results on offer. The 576 
metaphysics and the epistemology get put in their right place by Bayesian inference (getting a 577 
prediction right in advance has no metaphysical status as an indication of good theory; but it does 578 
help us know when we have one). 579 
In considering what a general theory predicts in order to calculate the Bayes factor, one 580 
might be tempted to use the obtained data to refine the estimate of the magnitude of the prediction 581 
for those very same data. That is the Bayesian way of cheating. The data are thereby “double 582 
counted”, once for connecting theory to predictions, then again for considering whether the 583 
predictions are confirmed, and so involve a violation of the axioms of probability (Jeffreys, 1939; 584 
Jaynes, 2003).   Double counting has to be evaluated with respect to whether the axioms of 585 
probability are violated. For example, the general theory that ‘priming occurs in this context’ cannot 586 
be evaluated by using the obtained data to specify what the theory predicts (and then using the 587 
same data to test the predictions of the general theory). So what about if one found the Bayes factor 588 
not for the general theory but for a specific theory specifying the magnitude of the effect, which 589 
happened to be the magnitude shown in the data? That is now OK. All that matters is the probability 590 
of the data given the theory; where the theory came from does not matter, according to the 591 
principles of Bayesian inference. The issue, and hence the solution, is similar to that considered in 592 
the last section: If we are as scientists interested in the general theory, then an arbitrary version of it  593 
has no special interest to us beyond any other arbitrary version. While there may be evidence for 594 
the specific theory that priming occurs in this context with magnitude 12.63 seconds, there may be  595 
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evidence against the general theory that priming occurs in this context (cf. Section 2.3). Further, if a 596 
mechanism of priming occurred to you after looking at the data, and for reasons independent of the 597 
data that mechanism would predict a likely priming effect of 12 ms, the data provide support for 598 
that theory. 599 
The Bayesian answer helps show why pre-registered reports, such as used in Cortex and now 600 
at least 16 other journals (Chambers, Feredoes, Muthukumaraswamy, & Etchells, 2014; 601 
Wagenmakers et al., 2012; see the website Registered Reports, 2015, for regular updates) are 602 
valuable. It is not due to the magical power of guessing Nature in advance. Rather, pre-registration 603 
ensures the public availability of all results that are pre-registered, regardless of the pattern, which is 604 
important for all approaches to statistical inference, Bayesian or otherwise (Goldacre, 2013). This 605 
alone is sufficient to justify an extensive use of pre-registered reports. In addition, pre-registration 606 
may help us judge such things as simplicity and elegance of theory more objectively. How much 607 
judgments of the properties of theory and their relation to predictions are affected by knowing the 608 
results in a naturalistic scientific context needs to be investigated further, but it is likely to be a 609 
substantial factor, perhaps moderated by experience (Arkes, 2013; Slovic, & Fischhoff, 1977).  This is 610 
an extra-statistical consideration that does not undermine the direct conclusions that follow from a 611 
Bayesian analysis (how well a theory is supported by data relative to another theory), but does raise 612 
the issue of the context of scientific judgments within which those conclusions are embedded. 613 
Finally, and very importantly, pre-registration helps deal with the problem of analytic 614 
flexibility (Chambers, 2015). There are generally various ways of analysing a given data set, each 615 
roughly equally justified. What should the cut off for outliers be – two or three SD, or something else? 616 
What transformation might be used, if the data look roughly equally normal with several? Should a 617 
covariate be added? Should the dependent variables be combined, or one of them dropped? And so 618 
on. Such considerations can affect Bayes factors as much as t-tests. It is possible to B-hack. Imagine 619 
that out of 10 roughly equally valid analysis methods, nine indicate support for H0 and one does not, 620 
as shown by a Bayes factor in each case. If one chose the final method because it fitted one’s agenda 621 
better, the Bayes factor no longer reflects what the data on balance say. However, if one chose the 622 
full analysis method in advance, it will, with 90% probability, be one of the nine methods supporting 623 
H0. Thus, with pre-registration the Bayesian analysis is more likely to reflect the overall message of 624 
the data. Note that in this case as well, the timing of predictions is just a proxy for the real thing; 625 
what actually matters are the objective properties of the data as they are. If by fluke (and it will 626 
sometimes happen) the pre-registered analysis method was the one method that did not obtain 627 
support for H0, the Bayesian analysis now fails to reflect the overall message of the data, even 628 
though the method was pre-registered. Thus, having all data transparently available must also be 629 
part of the solution. Then anyone with the time can check different ways of analysing the data for 630 
themselves. And in any argument that ensues, it may be worth bearing in mind that the pre-631 
registered method is likely, but is not guaranteed, to reflect what the data say on balance. 632 
The argument for pre-registration is particularly compelling for fMRI. Carp (2012a; see also 633 
2012b) considers common analytic decisions made in the fMRI literature and shows these lead to 634 
34,560 significance maps, which can be substantially different from each other. Considering all of 635 
these for each experiment is not feasible. Pre-registration would mean the Bayes factors calculated 636 
are likely to be reflective of the data. 637 
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In sum, using Bayes factors would change scientific practice by focusing attention on what 638 
matters – the relation of data to theory. No one would have pressure to pretend when they thought 639 
of the theory. People can focus on how simple and elegant the theory is and how tightly the 640 
predictions follow. Bayesian inference does not in itself solve all issues to do with the timing of 641 
events however; it should be combined with other solutions, such as pre-registration and full 642 
transparency. Even then, Bayesian inference sheds light on what the benefits of pre-registration 643 
actually are, and it should provide a conceptual framework to help focus discussions about the 644 
worth of different analyses (pre-registered versus after the data came in). For example, even if one 645 
baldly stated in advance that embodiment was more likely to produce priming than the use of words, 646 
that fact just in itself would not change the Bayes factors given in the last section (e.g. as weakening 647 
the general theory or supporting the specific one). 648 
 649 
3. Discussion 650 
Bayes factors provide a symmetrical measure of evidence for one model versus another (e.g. 651 
H1 versus H0) in order to relate theory to precisely the data relevant to it. These properties help 652 
solve some (but not all) of the problems underlying the credibility crisis in psychology. The symmetry 653 
of the measure of evidence means that there can be evidence for H0 just as much as for H1; or the 654 
Bayes factor may indicate insufficient evidence either way. P-values (even with power calculations) 655 
cannot make this three-way distinction, but making it is crucial to the integrity of science.  Bayes 656 
factors can be B-hacked but they mitigate the problem because a) they allow evidence in either 657 
direction so people will not be tempted to hack in just one direction; b) as a measure of evidence 658 
they are insensitive to the stopping rule; c) families of tests cannot be arbitrarily defined; and d) 659 
falsely implying a contrast is planned rather than post hoc becomes irrelevant (though the value of 660 
pre-registration is not mitigated). 661 
One advantage Bayesian inference can have is that it forces one to think about what one’s 662 
theory really predicts.  To calculate a Bayes factor, the theory (i.e. the psychological explanation) is 663 
represented as a distribution of possible population parameter values. Call this the model of H1 (i.e. 664 
a mathemetical description of relations). Our psychological theories are rarely stated directly as 665 
probability distributions over parameter values; thus, there needs to be a translation from theory to 666 
model, a translation that can take into account other findings in the data or literature to refine 667 
predictions.  The translation is not one to one; typically, the same theory could be translated to 668 
different models and different theories can be translated to the some of the same models.   Strictly, 669 
the Bayes factor indicates the relative support for the model versus H0; it is an extra-statistical 670 
matter to decide what work the theory did and how much credit it should get. For example, the 671 
theory that caffeine improves concentration because it is a placebo predicts that a cup of coffee 672 
should enhance performance on a concentration task. The exact model for how much a cup of 673 
coffee enhances concentration could be informed by the effect sizes past studies using coffee. If the 674 
model is supported how much does that support bear on the theory? That is a matter of scientific 675 
judgment, not statistics per se, and will depend on the full context (cf Gelman & Rubin, 1995). The 676 
art of science is partly setting up experiments where interesting theories can be compared using 677 
simple models, so that the Bayes factor is informative in discriminating the theories. Thus, one 678 
should set up a test of a theory, that when translated into a model, makes a risky prediction, i.e. one 679 
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contradicted by other background knowledge (Popper, 1963;  Roberts & Pashler, 2000; Vanpaemel, 680 
2014) so that the Bayes factor is likely to be discriminating if used to compare the contrasting 681 
theories.  682 
One problem with using Bayes factors is precisely that the psychological theory could be 683 
translated to several models; yet the support indicated by any given Bayes factor strictly refers to 684 
the model not the theory.  Thus, the distribution in the model needs to have those properties that 685 
capture relevant predictions of the theory in context, while the distribution's other properties 686 
should not alter the qualitative conclusion drawn from the resulting Bayes factor. If the outcome is 687 
robust to large distributional changes (while respecting the implementation of the same theory), the 688 
distributions are acceptable for use in Bayes factors, and the conclusion transfers to the theory (cf 689 
Good, 1983). This is referred to as robustness checking. For example if the application of a theory to 690 
an experiment indicates that the raw maximum difference should not be more than about m, then 691 
try simple distributions that satisfy this judgement yet change their shapes in other ways: Dienes 692 
(2014) suggests a uniform from 0 to m; a half-normal with mode 0 and standard deviation m/2; and 693 
a normal with mean m/2 and standard deviation m/4. In all cases the (at least rough) maximum is m 694 
yet in one case the distribution is flat, in another the probability is pushed up to one side, and in 695 
another peaked in the middle. If the qualitative conclusions remain unaltered, the conclusion carries 696 
from the models to the theory. A different approach may be to declare in advance which distribution 697 
will be used (with reasons) on the grounds such a distribution is likely to reflect the conclusion from 698 
most simple representations of the theory (see section 2.4). 699 
An example of Bayes factors motivating a closer consideration of theory is provided by 700 
Dienes, 2015; see also the examples in Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014): Sometimes Bayes requires that 701 
extra data are gathered on a different condition in order to interpret another condition, data not 702 
demanded by p-value calculations. For example, in order to claim that a measure of conscious 703 
knowledge shows chance performance, we need data to estimate what level of conscious 704 
performance could be expected if the priming or learning performance claimed to be unconscious 705 
had actually been based on conscious knowledge. Further, as soon as one thinks what level of raw 706 
effect size would be predicted in one’s study, one has to carefully consider the literature with eyes 707 
one may not have had before, to estimate how well effect sizes in one paper might apply to one’s 708 
own, given a change in context. Once effect sizes become relevant to the conclusions one draws, 709 
people may pay attention to them. 710 
In conclusion, I argue that the use of Bayes factors is a crucial part of the solution to the 711 
crisis in which psychology (and other disciplines) find themselves.  Now that the problems of what 712 
we have been doing up to now are evident (e.g. Ioannidis, 2005; John et al., 2014; Open Science 713 
Collaboration, 2015; Pashler & Harris, 2012), I hope Bayes is seriously considered as part of the 714 
solution - along with, for example, full transparency and online availability of materials, data and 715 
analysis (Nosek, Alter, Banks, Borsboom et al., 2015); greater emphasis on direct replications as well 716 
as multi-experiment theory building (Asendorpf, Conner, De Fruyt, De Houwer et al., 2013); and 717 
increasing use of pre-registration (Chambers, Dienes, McIntosh, Rotshtein  et al., 2015). 718 
  719 
21 
 
References 720 
Arkes, H. (2013). The Consequences of the Hindsight Bias in Medical Decision Making. 721 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22, 356-360. 722 
Asendorpf, J. B., Conner, M., De Fruyt, F., De Houwer, J., Denissen, J.J.A., Fiedler, K., Fiedler, 723 
S., Funder, D. C., Kliegl, R., Nosek, B. A.,Perugini, M., Roberts, B. W., Schmitt, M., van Aken, M. A. G., 724 
Weber, H., & Wicherts, J. M. (2013). Recommendations for increasing replicability in psychology. 725 
European Journal Of Personality, 27(2), 108-119. 726 
Baguley, T., & Kaye, W. S. (2010). Review of Understanding psychology as a science: An 727 
introduction to scientific and statistical inference. British Journal of Mathematical & Statistical 728 
Psychology, 63, 695-698. 729 
Berger, J. O., & Berry, D. A. (1988a). The relevance of stopping rules in statistical inference. 730 
In S. S. Gupta & J. O. Berger (Eds), Statistical decision theory and related topics, Vol. 4 (pp. 29–72). 731 
New York: Springer Verlag. 732 
Berger, J. O., & Berry, D. A. (1988b). Statistical analysis and the illusion of objectivity. 733 
American Scientist, 76, 159–165. 734 
Berger, J. O., & Wolpert, R. L. (1988). The likelihood principle. Hayward (CA): Institute of  735 
Mathematical Statistics. 736 
Birnbaum, A. (1962).  On the foundations of statistical inference. Journal of the American 737 
Statistical Association, 57 (298), 269–326. 738 
Carp, J. (2012a). On the plurality of (methodological) worlds: estimating the analytic 739 
flexibility of fMRI experiments. Frontiers in Neuroscience, doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00149 740 
Carp, J. (2012b).  The secret lives of experiments: Methods reporting in the fMRI literature. 741 
NeuroImage, 63, 289–300. 742 
Chambers, C. D. (2015). Ten reasons why journals must review manuscripts before results 743 
are known. Addiction, 110(1), 10-11. 744 
Chambers, C. D., Dienes, Z., McIntosh, R. D., Rotshtein, P. and Willmes, K. (2015). Registered 745 
reports: realigning incentives in scientific publishing. Cortex, 66, A1-A2. 746 
Chambers, C. D., Feredoes, E., Muthukumaraswamy, S. D. and Etchells, P. (2014). Instead of 747 
"playing the game" it is time to change the rules: Registered Reports at AIMS Neuroscience and 748 
beyond. AIMS Neuroscience, 1(1), 4-17. 749 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioural sciences (2nd 750 
edition).Erlbaum: Hillsdale, NJ. 751 
Correll, J. (2008).  1/f noise and effort on implicit measures of bias. Journal of Personality 752 
and Social Psychology, 94, 48-59. 753 
22 
 
Dienes, Z. (2011). Bayesian versus Orthodox statistics: Which side are you on? Perspectives 754 
on Psychological Sciences, 6, 274-290.  755 
Dienes, Z. (2014). Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results. Frontiers in 756 
Psychology, 5: 781. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00781 757 
Dienes, Z (2015a). How Bayesian statistics are needed to determine whether mental states 758 
are unconscious. In M. Overgaard (Ed.), Behavioural Methods in Consciousness Research. Oxford: 759 
Oxford University Press , pp 199-220. 760 
Dienes, Z. (2015, b). 761 
http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes%20factor%20with%20t%20di762 
stribution.html  Retrieved 25 August 2015. Fall forms 763 
Estes, Z., Verges, M., Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Head up, foot down: object words orient 764 
attention to the objects' typical location. Psychological Science, 19, 93-97. 765 
Etz, A. (2015). http://alexanderetz.com/2015/08/30/the-bayesian-reproducibility-project/ 766 
Retrieved 30 Sept 2015. 767 
Fanelli, D. (2010). ‘‘Positive’’ results increase down the hierarchy of the sciences. PLoS One, 5, 768 
e10068. 769 
Feynman, R. P. (1998). The meaning of it all. Penguin Books. 770 
Fisher, R. A. (1935). The design of experiments. Oliver and Boyd. 771 
Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S., Dunson, D. B.,  Vehtari, A., & Rubin, D. B. (2013). 772 
Bayesian Data Analysis, Third Edition. Chapman & Hall.  773 
Gelman, A.  & Loken, E. (2013). The garden of forking paths: Why multiple comparisons can 774 
be a problem, even when there is no “ﬁshing expedition” or “p-hacking” and the research hypothesis 775 
was posited ahead of time.  Unpublished paper.  Available from: 776 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/p_hacking.pdf.  Retrieved 1 July 777 
2014. 778 
Gelman, A., & Rubin, D. B. (1995). Avoiding model selection in Bayesian social research. In (P. 779 
V. Marsden, Ed.), Sociological Methodology (pp 165--173).  Oxford: Blackwell.  780 
Goldacre, B. (2013). Bad Pharma: How Medicine is Broken, And How We Can Fix It. Fourth 781 
Estate.  782 
Good, I. J. (1983). Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and Its Applications. 783 
University of Minnesota Press 784 
Hoijtink, H. (2011). Informative hypotheses: Theory and practice for behavioral and social 785 
scientists. Chapman and Hall/CRC. 786 
Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach (3rd edition.). 787 
Chicago: Open Court. 788 
23 
 
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Medicine, 2, 789 
e124. 790 
Ioannidis, J. P.A., Munafò, M. R., Fusar-Poli, P., Nosek, B. A., & David, S. P. (2014). Publication 791 
and other reporting biases in cognitive sciences: detection, prevalence, and prevention.  Trends in 792 
Cogntiive Sciences, 18 (5), 235–241.  793 
Jaynes, E.T. (2003). Probability theory: The logic of science. Cambridge, England: 1044 794 
Cambridge University Press. 795 
Jeffreys, H. (1939). The theory of probability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 796 
John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2012). Measuring the prevalence of questionable 797 
research practices with incentives for truth-telling. Psychological Science, 23, 524–532. 798 
Keppel, G., & Zedeck, S. (1989). Data analysis for research designs: Analysis of variance and 799 
multiple regression/correlation approaches. New York: Freeman. 800 
Kruschke, J. K. (2010). Doing Bayesian Data Analysis: A Tutorial with R and BUGS. Academic 801 
Press: London. 802 
Lanczos, C. (1974). The Einstein decade (1905-1915). Elek Science: London. 803 
Lee, M. D., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2014). Bayesian Cognitive Modeling: A Practical Course. 804 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 805 
Lindley, D.V. (1957). A Statistical Paradox. Biometrika, 44 (1–2), 187–192. 806 
Lindley, D. V. (1971). The estimation of many parameters. In V. Godambe & D. Sprott (Eds), 807 
Foundations of statistical inference (pp 435 – 447). Toronto: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. 808 
Ly, A., Verhagen, A. J., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (in press). Harold Jeffreys’s default Bayes factor 809 
hypothesis tests: Explanation, extension, and application in psychology. Journal of Mathematical 810 
Psychology. 811 
Masicampo, E. J., & Lalande, D. R. (2012). A peculiar prevalence of p values just below .05. 812 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65, 2271-2279. 813 
Morey, R. D., Hoekstra, R., Rouder, J. N., Lee, M. D., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2015). The fallacy 814 
of placing confidence in confidence intervals. Manuscript submitted for publication. 815 
http://www.ejwagenmakers.com/submitted/fundamentalError.pdf  Retrieved 27 August 2015. 816 
Morey, R. D., Romeijn, J. and Rouder, J. N. (2013). The humble Bayesian: Model checking 817 
from a fully Bayesian perspective. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66(1), 818 
68-75. 819 
Morey, R. D., & Rouder J. N. (2011). Bayes factor approaches for testing interval null 820 
hypotheses. Psychological Methods, 16, 406-419. 821 
Neyman, J., & Pearson, E. (1967). Joint Statistical Papers. Hodder Arnold. 822 
24 
 
Nosek, B. A., Alter, G., Banks, G. C., Borsboom, D., Bowman, S. D., Breckler, S. J., Buck, S., 823 
Chambers, C. D., Chin, G., Christensen, G., Contestabile, M., Dafoe, A., Eich, E., Freese, J., Glennerster, 824 
R., Goroff, D., Green, D. P., Hesse, B., Humphreys, M., Ishiyama, J., Karlan, D., Kraut, A., Lupia, A., 825 
Mabry, P., Madon, T. A., Malhotra, N., Mayo-Wilson, E., McNutt, M., Miguel, E., Levy Paluck, E., 826 
Simonsohn, U., Soderberg, C., Spellman, B. A., Turitto, J., VandenBos, G., Vazire, S., Wagenmakers, E. 827 
J., Wilson, R., & Yarkoni, T. (2015). Promoting an open research culture. Science, 348, 1422-1425. 828 
Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. 829 
Science, 349(6251), 943-951. Doi: 10.1126/science.aac4716 830 
Pashler, H., & Harris, C. R. (2012). Is the replicability crisis overblown? Three arguments 831 
examined. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 531–536 832 
Pashler, H., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2012). Editors' introduction to the special section on 833 
replicability in psychological science: A crisis of confidence? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 834 
528-530. 835 
Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge.  836 
Registered Reports, https://osf.io/8mpji/wiki/home/. Retrieved 27 August 2015. 837 
Roberts, S., & Pashler, H. (2000). How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing. 838 
Psychological review, 107(2), 358-367 839 
Rosenthal, R. (1979). An introduction to the file drawer problem. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 840 
638-641. 841 
Rouder, J. N. (2014). Optional Stopping: No Problem For Bayesians. Psychonomic Bulletin & 842 
Review, 21, 301-308. 843 
Rouder, J. N., & Morey R. D. (2011). A Bayes-Factor Meta Analysis of Bem’s ESP Claim. 844 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 682-689. 845 
Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). Bayesian t tests for 846 
accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 225–237. 847 
Sagarin B. J., Ambler J. K., Lee E. M. (2014). An ethical approach to peeking at data.  848 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 293–304. 849 
Sanborn, A. N. & Hills, T. T. (2014). The frequentist implications of optional stopping on 850 
Bayesian hypothesis tests. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, 283-300. 851 
Savage, L.J. (1962). The foundations of statistical inference: A discussion. London: Methuen 852 
Schoenbrodt, F. D., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Zehetleitner, M., & Perugini, M. (in press). 853 
Sequential hypothesis testing with Bayes factors: Efficiently testing mean differences. Psychological 854 
Methods. 855 
25 
 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False– positive psychology:  856 
Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. 857 
Psychological Science, 22, 1359–1366. 858 
Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2014). P-curve: A Key To The File Drawer. 859 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 534-547. 860 
Slovic, P., & Fischhoff, B. (1977). On the psychology of experimental surprises. Journal of 861 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3, 544–551 862 
Stone, J. V. (2013). Bayes’ Rule: A tutorial introduction to Bayesian analysis. Sebtel Press. 863 
Storey, J. D. (2003). The positive False Discovery Rate: a Bayesian interpretation and the q-864 
value. The Annals of Statistics, 31, 2013–2035. 865 
Vanpaemel, W. (2010). Prior sensitivity in theory testing: An apologia for the Bayes factor. 866 
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 54, 491–498. 867 
Vanpaemel, W. (2014).  Theory Testing with the Prior Predictive. Oral presentation at the 868 
26th Annual Convention of the Association for Psychological Science, 22-25 May, San Francisco. 869 
Wagenmakers, E. J. (2007). A practical solution to the pervasive problems of p values. 870 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 779-804. 871 
Wagenmakers, E. J., Wetzels, R., Borsboom, D., van der Maas, H. L. J., & Kievit, R. A. (2012). 872 
An Agenda for Purely Confirmatory Research. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 632–638. 873 
Yu, E. C., Sprenger, A. M., Thomas, R. P., & Dougherty, M. R. (2014). When decision heuristics 874 
and science collide. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, 268–282 875 
  876 
26 
 
Appendix 877 
Comparing error properties of a Bayes factor with inference by intervals 878 
 879 
One way of distinguishing H1 from H0 is by use of inference by intervals (Dienes, 2014). This 880 
requires specifying not a point null, but a null region, whose limits are the minimally interesting 881 
effect size.  According to the rules of inference by intervals, if the interval (confidence, credibility, or 882 
likelihood9) is contained within the null region, then the null region hypothesis can be accepted. If 883 
the interval is entirely outside the null region, then H1 can be accepted. If the interval spans both the 884 
null region and regions outside, then the data do not discriminate H0 and H1 (Dienes, 2014). The 885 
stopping rule to guarantee a clear conclusion is therefore to stop when the null region is either 886 
entirely within or entirely without the null region. 887 
In the limit as null region shrinks to [0,0] the method becomes significance testing, with all 888 
its faults (including the inability to assert the null hypothesis). The properties of the method must 889 
depend on how big the interval is relative to the null region is. If the maximum number of 890 
participants before stopping (MaxN) is 100 and the null region is NR[0,0] (i.e. a point null is used and 891 
so the method is significance testing), then H1 is accepted 36% of the time when H0 is true (using 892 
the same experimental set up as in Table 1). Table 3 shows error rates (estimated by 1000 893 
simulations for each value) for NR[-0.1, 0.1]. Even with no restriction on the width of the interval, 894 
false alarms fall from 36% to 16% (first column) compared to significance testing. This is similar to 895 
the Bayes factor for a threshold of 3. However, unlike for a Bayes factor, H0 is never accepted when 896 
it is true. One hundred participants are just insufficient to get the interval small enough to fit into 897 
the null region (even though a dz of 0.1 may be quite satisfactory for supporting H1 for many 898 
researchers: A dz of 0.1 corresponds to an r of 0.49; and for the 100 studies replicated by the 899 
Reproducibility Project to date, 70 had an original effect size smaller than this, Open Science 900 
Collaboration, 2015, and were used as evidence for H1). 901 
 902 
Table 3 Decision rates for accepting/rejecting H0 for NR[-0.1, 0.1] MaxN  = 100 MinN = 1  903 
 904 
 Minimum 
width : 
none 10*NRW 5*NRW 4*NWR 3*NRW 2*NRW NRW 0.5*NRW 
Actual 
effect : 
         
dz = 0 
 
Reject 16 14 7 4 3 1 0 0 
Accept 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
dz = 1 
 
Reject 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 
Accept 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 905 
                                                          
9 Though see Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & Wagenmakers (2015) for why it should be, or correspond to, a 
credibility interval. 
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 906 
Table 4 shows what happens when MaxN is increased to 1000.  Now H0 is often accepted 907 
when true, especially if we do not allow stopping to happen until the interval is smaller than a 908 
certain width. However, increasing MaxN increases error rates. This is unlike the case for Bayes 909 
factors. For Bayes factors, if MaxN is increased to 1000 then for a threshold of 10, for the null 910 
hypothesis, the rejection rate is 5% (same as for MaxN  = 100) and the acceptance rate is 93% (up 911 
from the 69% for MaxN = 100; see table 1). Increasing MaxN only improves things for Bayes factors, 912 
but increases false alarms for inference by intervals. Better error rates can be achieved for MaxN  = 913 
100 for Bayes factors than MaxN = 1000 for inference by intervals. 914 
 915 
Table 4 Decision rates for accepting/rejecting H0 for NR[-0.1, 0.1] MaxN  = 1000 MinN = 1  916 
 917 
 Minimum 
width : 
none 10*NRW 5*NRW 4*NWR 3*NRW 2*NRW NRW 0.5*NRW 
Actual 
effect : 
         
dz = 0 
 
Reject 19 12 6 5 2 1 0 0 
Accept 72 78 83 84 86 88 89 0 
 
dz = 1 
 
Reject 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
Accept 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 918 
 919 
As for Bayes factors, ensuring a minimum number of trials has occurred before stopping 920 
improves error rates for inference by intervals. Table 5 shows the improvement for requiring 10 921 
participants to be run before optional stopping occurs as compared to table 4. Still the error rates 922 
are higher than those for Bayes factors shown in Table 2. 923 
 924 
Table 5 Decision rates for accepting/rejecting H0 for NR[-0.1, 0.1] MaxN  = 1000 MinN = 10  925 
 926 
 Minimum 
width : 
none 10*NRW 5*NRW 4*NWR 3*NRW 2*NRW NRW 0.5*NRW 
Actual 
effect : 
         
dz = 0 
 
Reject 9 8 7 5 2 1 0 0 
Accept 79 82 82 82 87 88 88 0 
 
dz = 1 
 
Reject 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
Accept 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 927 
28 
 
 928 
 929 
R code 930 
Each participant provides a single difference score, sampled from a normal distribution with 931 
a standard deviation of 1. Thus, the specified population effect sizes are dz’s (Cohen, 1988). 932 
Maximum number of participants before stopping (MaxN) = 100;  minimum number of participants 933 
before checking after every trial (MinN) = 1. Assumes population standard deviation is known. 934 
 935 
******************************************* 936 
 937 
MaxN = 1000; # maximum number of trials after which stopping is guaranteed 938 
MinN = 1; # minimum number of trials before stopping 939 
n.reject = 0;     #number of times null is rejected 940 
n.accept = 0;   #number of  times null is accepted 941 
M = 0.1; # the minimum meaningful effect size for a symmetric Null Region 942 
d = 1; #population effect size 943 
NR.LL = -M; NR.UL = M;  #putting limits on Null Region  944 
NR.width = NR.UL - NR.LL;   945 
S = 0.5;  #multiple of null region widths the CI has to be less than before stopping 946 
 947 
 for (i in 1: 1000) 948 
{ 949 
reject = 0; accept = 0; sum = 0;   first = 0; 950 
for (j in 1:MaxN) 951 
{ 952 
x = rnorm(1, d, 1);  953 
sum = sum + x; mean = sum/j; SE = 1/j^0.5;  z = mean/SE; 954 
hwidth = 1.96*SE;  LL = mean - hwidth; UL = mean + hwidth; 955 
width = 2*hwidth; 956 
29 
 
 if (UL < NR.LL)  if (width < S*NR.width)  if ( j > MinN) if (first == 0) 957 
{ 958 
  reject=1; first = 1;   # reject the null and register this happened first 959 
} 960 
if (LL > NR.UL) if (width < S*NR.width) if ( j > MinN) if (first == 0) 961 
{ 962 
 reject = 1; first = 1; 963 
  } 964 
if (LL > NR.LL)  if (UL < NR.UL)  if (width < S*NR.width)  if ( j > MinN) if (first == 0) 965 
{ 966 
  accept=1; first = 1; 967 
} 968 
} 969 
n.reject = n.reject + reject; 970 
n.accept = n.accept + accept; 971 
} 972 
n.reject/10   #per cent reject  null 973 
n.accept/10   #per cent accept null 974 
